This paper argues that the growing US trade deficit has caused the decline of the WTO and the rise of regional trade agreements. Growing imbalances make countries more selective about who to cooperate with. This is formally shown in a three-country negotiation game that is based on a goods-market model. Subsequently, the model is parameterized and applied quantitatively. Using historical data, the model correctly predicts the date that US-Canada FTA talks began. Based on current data, moreover, the model paints a bleak picture for multilateralism: US exports to China would have to triple for a new WTO round to stand a chance. But even this may be insufficient: a dynamic extension of the game shows that regionalism can have a lock-in effect. Nonetheless, this does not plead for tougher WTO rules on regionalism. As is argued both qualitatively and quantitatively, these may push countries to less, not more, cooperation.
Introduction
Over the past two decades the way countries negotiate trade liberalization has changed remarkably. The multilateral process, responsible for the highly successful post-War liberalization e¤ort, has slowed down, arguably reaching a standstill at the WTO's Doha Round. At the same time, trade agreements outside of the multilateral system have grown at an extraordinary pace. The solid line in Figure 1 depicts the number of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs). 1 9 5 1 1 9 5 4 1 9 5 7 1 9 6 0 1 9 6 3 1 9 6 6 1 9 6 9 1 9 7 2 1 9 7 5 1 9 7 8 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 7 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 5 But what is it that made the US government suddenly change policy? Why did this happen in the 1980s and why has regionalism persisted ever since?
Number of RTAs
In sum: what is the economic rationale for the hypothesis proposed by Bhagwati? This paper presents a theory capable of providing that rationale. Its explanation is based on the rise of trade imbalances. From the 1980s onwards, we argue, the growing US trade de…cit has made selective trade partnerships more attractive for the US government. This has stalled multilateralism and has made countries around the world pursue the regionalist alternative. The broken line in Figure 1 displays the evolution of the US trade balance.
The basic mechanism is intuitive. When a bilateral trade imbalance is large enough, the de…cit country can be better o¤ under non-cooperation than under bilateral free trade. The reason is that a country in de…cit loses much by giving up independent tari¤ setting. It has large market power over its import goods, and hence a strong incentive to depress their prices using import tari¤s. At the same time, because a de…cit country exports relatively little, it gains less from lower tari¤s on its exports abroad. Empirical work by Broda et al. (2006) and Bagwell and Staiger (2006) provides support for the theory that countries set higher tari¤s on goods that they have more market power over. Using probit regressions, moreover, both Magee (2003) and Holmes (2005) …n d that a larger bilateral trade imbalance implies a signi…cantly smaller probability that two countries form a RTA. For instance, Magee (2003) estimates the e¤ect of increasing a country's bilateral trade surplus with another country from zero to ten percent of total bilateral trade in 1980. He …n d s that this reduces the probability that the two countries sign a RTA before 1998 by 3.4%. Now consider a multi-country setting. If a de…cit country wants to cooperate at all, it will prefer to choose a partner towards which its de…cit is small. It becomes selective. Instead of proceeding multilaterally, which restricts its choice, it opts for a regional route. We formalize this intuition in a negotiation game with three countries. One country, X, has a trade de…cit against both others, Y and Z, but a larger de…cit towards Z. One can think of X as the US, Z as Japan in the 1980s or China nowadays, and Y as the rest of the world. In an appendix we provide a microfounding model for the game's setting, where trade imbalances come about through optimal consumption smoothing in response to country-speci…c income shocks.
Negotiations in the game consist of two stages: multilateral and bilateral. In each stage, those agreements are signed for which all parties state that they consent. The game is solved using three properties, which we show can be derived from our microfounding goods market model: …r s t l y, a country's bene…t of a RTA increases in the trade surplus towards its partner; secondly, there is a threshold bilateral trade de…cit beyond which a country is better o¤ without a RTA; …n a l l y, a RTA between two countries reduces the welfare of the third country.
The game has three equilibria: multilateralism, regionalism and complete non-cooperation. On the basis of the three properties, we identify a set of restrictions on the size of the bilateral trade imbalances, which relate to the equilibrium outcome. When all restrictions hold, we say that imbalances are small. When some are violated, imbalances are large. And when none hold, imbalances are extreme. For extreme imbalances there is complete noncooperation. For large imbalances, instead, a regionalist equilibrium emerges with bilateral cooperation between X Y or Y Z or both. Multilateralism only comes about for small imbalances. Thus, rising trade imbalances can trigger the move from multilateralism to regionalism. This is the central result of the paper.
But how large is large? For what size of imbalances does a shift occur? To analyze the quantitative implications of our theory, we parameterize the microfounding model. We …n d that an analytical solution exists. After deriving optimal tari¤s, we obtain closed-form expressions for a country's welfare under multilateralism and under regionalism. Taking the di¤erence between the two, we arrive at the solution for the threshold value. As it turns out, this value can be given an astonishingly simple interpretation. Country X switches to regionalism whenever its imports from country Z are more than twice its exports to that country.
Using this straightforward prediction, we can apply the model to the data. We develop an application in which the game's players are the US, Japan and Canada (the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement was the …r s t major RTA the US negotiated). Based on trade data for 1960-1990, we …n d that, while Canada remains within cooperation boundaries throughout, the threshold value with Japan is crossed in 1984. This means that the model predicts that US-Canada negotiations should start in that year. This outcome is quite accurate, as actual talks began in 1985.
Subsequently, we consider what the model can tell us about current trade negotiations. If China can nowadays be seen as ful…lling the role of country Z in the game, then our work paints a bleak future for multilateralism. Given the current level of imports from China, US exports to that country should be three times what they are now for WTO negotiations to stand a chance.
However, even if trade imbalances would fall to such an extent, the shift to regionalism can be lasting. We extend the game to a dynamic setting and show that regionalism can have a lock-in e¤ect. The reason is that once RTAs have been formed, insiders to the agreements gain rents over outsiders. These insiders may then not have su¢ cient incentive to proceed multilaterally, even if trade imbalances disappear over time. Thus, temporary imbalances can trigger a lasting change in the structure of trade agreements.
Nonetheless, the existence of the regionalist option can be valuable to the global economy. Without it, countries are left with a choice between multilateralism and complete non-cooperation. For moderate imbalances a restricted choice can force the de…cit country into multilateral cooperation, raising world welfare. But for su¢ ciently large trade imbalances regionalism safeguards partial cooperation over complete non-cooperation. The quanti…ed model suggests that trade imbalances have grown close to the threshold for which this occurs.
The next section reviews the related literature. Section 3 presents our one-shot game. Section 4 derives its welfare implications. Our quantitative application is developed in section 5. Subsequently, section 6 considers the game's dynamic extension. Finally, section 7 discusses the policy implications of our theory.
Literature review
There exist several alternatives to our explanation of the decline of multilateralism and the rise of regionalism.
1 Krugman (1993) has argued that, …r s t l y, regionalism can go deeper than multilateralism on non-tari¤ issues and that, secondly, growing GATT/WTO membership has aggravated free-rider problems. Both arguments are often heard in policy debates on regionalism and the WTO (Collier (2006) ). Baldwin (1997) has pointed out, however, that the regionalism of the 80s and 90s was actually primarily concerned with tari¤ liberalization, while Ludema (1991) has formally shown that free riding need not undermine multilateralism when conducted under the Most Favored Nation principle.
Baldwin (1995) o¤ers a di¤erent perspective. In his model governments only join a RTA if the lobbying support of exporters exceeds that of importers. When, exogenously, a single RTA is signed among two countries, lobbying e¤orts in other countries tilt favorably towards supporting RTA. Thus, a single event of regionalism can lead to a domino e¤ect, which can explain why existing blocs expand. But the model does not provide a rationale for the initial choice for regionalism, nor for the slowing of the multilateral process.
Freund (2000a) does model the choice for regionalism. She shows that RTAs become more attractive when multilateral tari¤s are low. For high multilateral tari¤s overall e¢ ciency incentives dominate, and non-discriminatory liberalization is best. But for low tari¤s, incentives to divert trade through exclusionary RTAs gain importance. Therefore, gradual multilateral liberalization can lead to growing regionalism. Multilateralism itself remains exogenous, however.
Our paper also relates to Bagwell and Staiger (1990) and Horn et al. (2006) . They show, in di¤erent settings, that when two countries cooperate on trade policy, times of trade imbalances should be paired with higher cooperative tari¤s. This compensates the de…cit country for the inability to make use of its market power against the other country.
One-shot game
The way trade imbalances a¤ect regionalism is best understood in a simple one-shot game. There are three players, namely countries X, Y and Z. These countries di¤er in their bilateral trade balances towards each other. We let T B ij ( ) denote the bilateral trade balance of country i with country j when the set of agreements is in force (speci…ed below). Here, clearly, one country's bilateral surplus is the other's bilateral de…cit, T B ij ( ) = T B ji ( ), and world trade is always balanced, P i P j T B ij ( ) = 0. We obtain a simple analytical setting by ranking countries on the basis of their initial trade balances. That is, their trade balances in the absence of any agreements, =f;g. In particular, we let X be the de…cit country, Y the middle country and Z the surplus country. Country X is in de…cit against both others, but with a larger de…cit against Z: T B XZ ( )j =f;g < T B XY ( )j =f;g < 0. And country Z in surplus against both others, with a larger surplus against X: T B XZ ( )j =f;g < T B Y Z ( )j =f;g < 0. In Appendix B we present a goods-market model that provides microfoundations for the setting we assume here. This microfounding model is based on two periods. In it, the game described below takes place in the second period, against given trade imbalances, which are generated through …r s t -p e r i o d income shocks.
Countries X, Y and Z play the trade negotiation game depicted in Figure 2 . Thus, negotiations take the form of a statement game. First, each country announces whether it accepts or rejects the Multilateral Trade Agreement (MTA). When all accept it, the MTA is signed. But if any country rejects it, the MTA fails and RTA negotiations begin. Regionalism is thus modelled as the outside option to multilateralism. Likewise, during RTA negotiations only those agreements are signed on which there is mutual consent. As a tie-breaking assumption, countries accept an agreement towards which they are indi¤erent. We denote the RTA between countries i and j by RT A ij .
Overall, at the end of negotiations the set of agreement, , can include either the MTA, or any of RT A XY , RT A XZ , RT A Y Z , or it can remain the empty set =f;g. After negotiations have been completed, tari¤s are set. Countries implement zero tari¤s against their MTA/RTA partners. We assume that countries commit themselves to the agreements that they sign during negotiations, and cannot subsequently defect from them. 3 However, an agreement between two countries imposes no constraints on their policies towards the third country. 4 Thus, we have de…ned the game's players and their actions. Finally, we assume that governments are social welfare maximizers, and de…ne three properties concerning the way that trade agreements and trade balances a¤ect a country's welfare. Our microfounding model in Appendix B shows that these properties can be formally derived from a general speci…cation with maximizing agents. Below we brie ‡y explain the intuition behind each property.
P1 A country's net bene…t of having a bilateral agreement with another country is increasing in the trade surplus towards it:
where W i is country i's sum of producer surplus, consumer surplus and tari¤ revenues.
P2 For a given set of agreements ( ) that does not include RT A ij (RT A ij = 2 ) there exists a threshold bilateral trade de…cit, T B ij < 0, below which country i is better o¤ not signing RT A ij . That is, country i's net bene…t of the RTA is zero at the threshold:
P3 Two insiders to a RTA impose a negative externality on the outsider's welfare:
2 < 0 and worsen the outsider's trade balance:
Intuitively, the de…cit country has more market power over its imports from the surplus country than vice versa. Thus, giving up the ability to in ‡uence the prices of import goods is more costly for the de…cit country, which is the …r s t property. This gives rise to a trade-o¤ between the e¢ ciency gains of mutual tax elimination and the cost of yielding unrestricted tari¤ setting. Under balanced trade the bilateral trade agreement is always mutually bene…cial. But beyond a threshold bilateral imbalance, the de…cit country is better o¤ without an agreement. 5 This is the intuition behind the second property. Finally, the third property stems from the fact that the two insiders to a RTA raise the demand for, and thereby the prices of, each other's export goods. Hence, the outsider country pays more for its imports from them, which lowers its welfare and reduces its bilateral trade balances. 6 Taken together, properties P1-P3 are su¢ cient to solve the game depicted in Figure 2 (proof in Appendix A):
Proposition 1 There are three types of Nash Equilibria:
, and complete non-cooperation ( =f;g).
Multilateralism obtains when trade imbalances are small enough that
T B XY ( )j =fRT A Y Z g T B XY and T B XZ ( )j =fRT A XY; RT A Y Z g T B XZ hold.
2.
Regionalism comes about when trade imbalances are su¢ ciently large that at least one of the above conditions is violated, but not so large that for all i with T B ij < 0 it holds that T B ij ( ) < T B ij 8 .
When for all i with
This is the central result of the paper. When trade imbalances are small enough, multilateral cooperation is feasible. But when they become too large, the de…cit country prefers to choose its partner selectively. This country's decision to opt out of multilateralism subsequently gives rise to worldwide regionalism.
We l f a r e implications
But does this mean that world welfare is reduced by the existence of the regionalist option? Would our theory plead for rules that make it harder for countries to form Regional Trade Agreements? Suggestions to strengthen GATT Article XXIV, which formulates the conditions allowing WTO members to join RTAs, have been heard in academic policy debates (see the discussion in section 7).
Assume, as is standard in international trade theory, that world welfare is largest under world free trade. The welfare e¤ect of regionalism then depends on the size of trade imbalances. For moderate imbalances regionalism is damaging. Consider the case where X loses a little from cooperating with Z, but gains much from a RTA with Y . Then, if X has the regionalist alternative, it rejects world free trade. But given the large gains from RT A XY , X prefers the MTA to complete non-cooperation. That is: restricting X's choice to multilateralism or complete non-cooperation, it opts for multilateralism. Now consider the opposite: X has a large trade de…cit towards Z and gains much from retaining independent tari¤ setting against it, while X is indi¤erent towards a RTA with Y . When X is faced with the choice between multilateralism and non-cooperation only, it chooses non-cooperation. In this case, regionalism safeguards partial free trade. 7 Formally (proof in Appendix A):
Proposition 2 Consider a No-Regionalism Game, in which rejection of the MTA implies complete non-cooperation, =f;g.
W X j =f;g multilateralism holds in the No-Regionalism Game but not in the standard Game. Trade imbalances are a distortion. They create harmful asymmetries between countries. The …r s t best solution would be the elimination of imbalances, or the establishment of a system of international transfers. When this is impossible, regionalism can sometimes be a second best solution.
Application
The results presented till now have been purely qualitative. But what exactly constitutes "large" imbalances in Proposition 1? What is the size of thresholds that causes the switch from multilateralism to regionalism? This section explores the quantitative implications of our model.
In particular, we apply the model to the US's 1980s switch to regionalism. As argued before, it was in this period that the US government broke with its tradition of supporting only multilateralism, and for the …r s t time sought separate trade partners. Relating to our model, we then take the US as country X, Canada as country Y , and Japan as country Z. After all, the major RTA of the era was the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (which later extended into NAFTA). 8 And Japan was, of course, the main country towards which the US experienced large trade de…cits at the time.
To be able to apply the model, we parameterize it and solve it analytically in Appendix C. The details of the approach are described there. In brief, in order to solve in closed-form the general model of Appendix B is simpli…ed along one dimension (countries only consume unique, imported goods) and functional forms are introduced (log utility and linear supply).
Substituting solutions for prices and demand into the expression for utility (which comprises consumer surplus, producer surplus and tari¤ revenues), a derivative is taken to …n d optimal tari¤s. With the solution for optimal tari¤s in hand, we compute the di¤erence between welfare under MTA and that under regionalism for country X. This represents the threshold value, as country X switches to regionalism whenever the di¤erence is negative.
Subsequently, we show that this threshold has a remarkably simple interpretation: country X chooses the regionalist path whenever the value of its imports from country Z is more than twice as large as the value of its exports to that country. The model thus provides us with an easy rule-of-thumb for trade cooperation.
The prediction of the model can now be taken to the data. Figure 3 plots the value of US exports to Japan, the value of US imports from Japan and the computed model threshold. Thus, the model predicts that the US should move towards regionalism -and away from the multilateral cooperation that includes Japan -in the year that the red line crosses the dotted line. That is, when US imports from Japan are more than twice exports to Japan.
This threshold is crossed in the year 1984. From Figure 4 we can see, moreover, that throughout the period Canada remains a feasible partner for trade cooperation. The model predicts, therefore, that negotiations on the US-Canada FTA would commence in 1984. This prediction is not too far o¤. In reality, it was on March 18th, 1985 that US President Reagan and Canadian Prime Minister Mulroney …r s t held talks on the Free Trade Agreement. 9 Negotiations were concluded in October 1987 10 and the agreement was signed on January 2nd, 1988. 11 8 The FTA with Canada was actually the second bilateral trade agreement that the US signed. The …r s t was the US-Israel FTA, concluded in 1985. However, this agreement was primariliy geopolitically motivated and of only minor economic relevance.
9 http://…ndarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1079/is_n2136_v88/ai_6637256/pg_3 10 http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/useu.aspx?lang=en 11 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canada-United_States_Free_Trade_Agreement 
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Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis and own computations Currently, the value of US imports from China is almost three times as large as the threshold value. That is, for the US to consider a global trade agreement that includes China, US exports to China should be three times what they are now (at given import value), or imports should drop to a third of their current level (at given export value). If the quantitative implications of our model are even remotely correct, therefore, a fresh start for the WTO may be a long way o¤.
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Dynamic extension
In discussing the potential of a reduction in current imbalances to rekindle multilateralism, the previous section implicitly assumed that the predictions of our static game carry through in a dynamic setting. That is, the same thresholds that cause a shift from regionalism to multilateralism, can, when crossed again, also lead the way back. But is this correct? Even if a su¢ ciently large reduction would at some point occur, would this necessarily always bring about renewed multilateralism?
To analyze this question we extend section 3's game to a dynamic setting. Each period is a precise repetition of the one-shot game in Figure 2 , except that negotiations only take place about agreements that have not previously been signed. Moreover, if a MTA is signed, it supplants any existing RTAs. Governments discount future periods at a rate 2 [0; 1].
The evolution of trade imbalances is as follows. In the …r s t period of the game trade imbalances are as in the basic game. Afterwards, there is balanced trade forever. This is a simple dynamic setting, but will already allow us to derive quite rich results. Furthermore, the dynamic game can be microfounded using precisely the same model as the basic game. One need only add the requirement that all period 0 debt (the pre-game period, see Appendix B) is repaid in period 1.
We solve the game by considering …r s t the decisions taken in the limit for di¤erent structures of previously signed agreements. The decisions in the …r s t period can then be derived by backward induction. The outcome is as follows (proof in Appendix A):
Proposition 3 There are three equilibrium paths to the dynamic game: multilateralism forever; permanent regionalism (one RTA forever); temporary regionalism (one or two RTAs in the …r s t period and multilateralism from the second period onwards). We cal l these the Good, the Bad and the Ugly Paths, respectively:
0 then for small …r s t period imbalances (as in point 1 of Proposition 1) the Good Path obtains, and otherwise the Ugly Path.
If t > 1,
there exists a value of the discount rate such that for all three paths are possible, and for < paths are as in (1).
Here, W t i j =fRT A ij g > W t i j =fMTAg means that even under balanced trade (t > 1) a country is better o¤ being the insider to the only RTA than being in a MTA. Notice that properties P1-P3 do not exclude this possibility. Intuitively, RTA insiders can gain rents by improving each other's terms-oftrade at the outsider's expense. The MTA destroys such rents.
What is surprising in Proposition 3 is the presence of the Bad Path. Temp orary trade imbalances can cause permanent regionalism. That is, trade imbalances can a¤ect the structure of trade agreements in a persistent, hysteretic manner. The reason is that regionalism creates rents for insiders. Thus, with regionalism in place, insiders may not participate to a multilateral agreement that they would otherwise have joined.
More precisely, when there is only one RTA and trade is balanced, RTA insiders face a trade-o¤. On the one hand, an insider has the incentive to sign an agreement with the excluded country. In this manner, it would become the insider on two RTAs and gain instantaneous welfare. On the other hand, it knows that the next period, the outsiders to the two respective agreements will be better o¤ signing the last RTA and achieving world free trade. Due to the size of RTA rents, world free trade is worse for the insider than one RTA. When patience is high enough, future losses outweigh instantaneous gains, and regionalism that was triggered by temporary imbalances may perpetuate.
Policy implications
Our theory relates the policy debate on global trade imbalances to the policy debate on the WTO. Until now these have been largely separate. If anything, some policy makers have suggested a role for the WTO in helping to bring down global imbalances (Dodge (2005) , De Rato (2005)). Our work indicates the possible importance of the opposite channel: limiting imbalances to garner incentives for faster trade liberalization. Reducing imbalances may, in principle, strengthen multilateralism. But, as shown by the dynamic game, this will not work if vested interests in existing RTAs are too large. However, even if countries are potentially willing to leave the regionalist path, the quantitative application of our model suggests that it would take a large reduction from the current level of imbalances to successfully restart multilateralism.
Our theory also relates to the policy question whether GATT Article XXIV should be strengthened. This Article governs the exception to nondiscriminatory (multilateral) liberalization granted to RTAs. Proponents of strengthening this Article (Bhagwati (1993) ) argue that larger barriers to RTA formation could aid world trade liberalization through the multilateral process. The result derived in section 4 cautions against such a move. In a world of large trade imbalances tougher rules on regionalism can end up pushing countries towards less, not more, trade cooperation.
In fact, we can use section 5's applied version of the model to analyze this issue quantitatively. With the US as country X, the question becomes when the US prefers multilateralism to complete non-cooperation. Figure 6 graphs total US imports and exports against the computed threshold. 
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis and own computations
Here, if the red line (total imports) crosses the black line (threshold), the US prefers non-cooperation to multilateralism. Hence, according to our computations trade imbalances are now very close to the zone where tougher rules on regionalism would back…re.
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Applying backward induction, we consider …r s t the outcome of RTA negotiations and then that of MTA negotiations. Below is country X's payo¤ matrix during RTA negotiations:
Other players'actions:
where it is implicit that whenever X accepts RT A XY or RT A XZ , Y or Z accept it too. This follows from P1 and P2: T B ij ( ) > 0 > T B ij . While by initial imbalances, T B XZ ( )j =f;g < T B XY ( )j =f;g < 0 and from P3, 
which, in turn, implies that
Hence, when Y and Z accept RT A Y Z , then =fRT A XY; RT A XZ ; RT A Y Z g achieves maximum welfare for country X and the action "Accept both" is optimal. However, by P3, the above welfare rankings directly imply
Therefore, "Accept both" is X's dominant strategy (i.e. optimal regardless of whether Y and Z accept RT A Y Z ).
Moreover, whenever X is willing to accept RT A XZ then, by T B XZ ( )j =f;g < T B Y Z ( )j =f;g < 0, Y is also willing to accept RT A Y Z (as is Z, by P2). Hence, during RTA negotiations all RTAs are accepted. Then, during the preceding MTA negotiations, countries face the choice between = fMTAg if all accept the MTA and =fRT A XY; RT A XZ ; RT A Y Z g if the MTA is rejected. Since both imply world free trade W i j =fRT A XY; RT A XZ ;RT A Y Z g = W i j =fMTAg 8i and by the tie-breaking assumption the MTA is accepted by all. This proves point 1 in Proposition 1.
Next, consider the case that for all i with T B ij < 0 it holds that T B ij ( ) < T B ij 8 (point 3 in Proposition 1). During RTA negotiations for each country pair there is one country (i with T B ij < 0) that rejects the RTA, regardless of other countries' actions (8 ) . Hence, RTA negotiations have =f;g as the outcome. At the preceding MTA negotiations, countries thus choose between =fMTAg and =f;g. Here, country X certainly rejects MTA. This follows from the fact that T B Xj ( ) < T B Xj 8 implies
and, by P3,
and country X rejects the MTA. Thus, the outcome of trade negotiations is =f;g which proves point 3 in Proposition 1. 
so that, regardless of whether Y and Z sign RT A Y Z , X achieves higher welfare without the MTA. Thus, when X rejects any RTA it also rejects the MTA. It remains to show that all three regionalist equilibria, =fRT
Hence, Y 's dominant strategy is "Accept only RT A XY ". Similarly, X is always best o¤ rejecting RT A XZ . Thus, by T B XY ( )j =f;g T B XY we have that =fRT A XY g results.
When, instead, T B XY ( )j =f;g < T B XY , T B XZ ( )j =fRT A XY g < T B XZ and T B Y Z ( )j =f;g T B Y Z then X's dominant strategy is "Reject both", and, given X's response, Y accepts RT A Y Z (as does Z). Therefore,
and Y 's dominant strategy is "Accept both". Given this action, X's best response is "Accept only RT A XY ", leading to =fRT A XY ; RT A Y Z g.
Proof of Proposition 2. By the Proof of Proposition 1, whenever country X accepts an agreement, then so do other countries. Furthermore, by P3,
and, therefore, in the standard Game it is the dominant strategy for X to reject the MTA during multilateral negotiations. But in the No-Regionalism Game X is left with W X j =fMTAg W X j =f;g and accepts the MTA. This proves point 1.
Similarly, by P3
holds for the setting in point 2. Hence, in the No-Regionalism Game X rejects the MTA, leading to =f;g. But in the standard Game X rejects the MTA, while playing dominant strategy "Accept RT A XY " during RTA negotiations. Hence, in the standard Game =f;g does not come about. This proves point 2.
Proof of Proposition 3. We …r s t prove the statement in point 1 and, subsequently, the statement in point 2. Given points 1 and 2, any initial
8 lead to one of the three equilibrium paths described in the statement of Proposition 3. Therefore, these equilibrium paths are the only ones that exist, and Proposition 3 is proven.
As described in the text, in the …r s t period initial trade balances are as in the one-shot game:
However, balanced trade is restored afterwards: T B t ij ( t ) = 08i; j; ; t > 1.
We prove point 1 by showing that when
08t > 1 then: a) for t > 1 world free trade (MTA) always obtains; b) in period 1 the MTA is signed only when imbalances are as in point 1 of Proposition 1. Given a) and b), for small enough …r s t period imbalances the MTA holds from period 1 onwards (Good Path), and if imbalances are larger, then there is temporary regionalism (Ugly Path).
Consider a). By assumption: T B t ij ( t ) = 08i; j; ; t > 1 and hence balanced trade obtains for t > 1. Given P3 and
08t > 1 country i has the following welfare ranking over t after period 1:
where t = ffMTAg fRT A j6 =i gg stands for the structure that includes the two RTAs to which country i can be part, but excludes RT A j6 =i . Moreover, by P1 and P2 W
Given this ranking, during RTA negotiations country i accepts any RTA that it had not previously signed, regardless of whether RT A j6 =i is in force. As this holds true for all countries, world free trade always obtains for t > 1. That is, in period t = 2, t = fRT A XY ; RT A XZ ; RT A Y Z g is known to be the outcome of RTA negotiations, and the MTA is accepted at the preceding MTA negotiations (by the tie-breaking assumption). Now, consider b). When …r s t period imbalances satisfy the conditions in point 1 of Proposition 1 then, by the Proof of Proposition 1, accepting the MTA is the best response viewed from instantaneous welfare. Moreover, the period 1 decision has no e¤ect on from period 2 onwards, which, by the above, is always MTA. Thus, the instantaneous-welfare maximizing choice (MTA) is accepted by all in period 1.
When, instead, …r s t period imbalances do not satisfy these conditions, country X is best o¤ rejecting at least RT A XZ (Proof of Proposition 1). Moreover, X loses no future welfare by doing so: regardless of …r s t period structure, future structure is MTA. Gaining instantaneously, but losing no welfare in the future, country X rejects the MTA in period 1. This completes the proof of point b).
Next, we prove point 2. By P3 and
08t > 1 we again obtain country i's welfare ranking over t for t > 1:
Consider the case that there is only one RTA, t = fRT A ij g. For instance, take t = fRT A XY g. Viewed from instantaneous welfare, "Accept RT A XZ " and "Accept RT A Y Z " are the dominant strategies for X and Y , respectively:
, and likewise for Y . Thus, accepting all RTAs (and, therefore, MTA at the preceding MTA negotiations) is a one-shot Nash Equilibrium.
However, both X and Y are worse o¤ under t = fMTAg than under t = fRT A XY g. Therefore, they could play a Tit-for-Tat strategy whereby neither signs the RTA with Z as long as the other does not do so either. If one country signs the RTA with Z, then the next period the other country signs it too. Hence, t = fRT A XY g is sustainable as long as the instantaneous gains from signing the RTA with Z, given that the other does not, are smaller than the subsequent losses from moving to world free trade. That is, given that all periods from t = 2 onwards are identical, the Bad Path can be sustained forever if:
Thus, there is some 2 (0; 1) such that for the Bad Path is sustainable. Of course, even for this is not the only equilibrium. If one or both players do not follow a Tit-for-Tat strategy, the MTA is signed. This proves point 2.
B Microfoundations
This appendix presents a general model that matches properties P1-P3. To do so the following elements will prove su¢ cient:
1. There are trade imbalances.
2.
There is full specialization in production.
3. Tari¤s can a¤ect the terms-of-trade.
4. There are gains from trade.
Before presenting the formal derivation, we explain intuitively how these elements lead to properties P1-P3. Trade imbalances in conjunction with the ability to a¤ect terms-of-trade lead to P1: the larger a country's trade de…cit is, the more it loses more from giving up the ability to in ‡uence its import prices. When, in addition, there are gains from trade, P2 obtains, because there is a trade-o¤ between the gains from trade and the losses from yielding independent tari¤ setting. Beyond a threshold trade de…cit, losses exceed gains. Finally, full specialization and the ability to a¤ect terms-of trade together bring about P3. The reason is that when two countries sign an agreement to cut bilateral tari¤s, they raise the price of each other's export goods. Given that the third country does not produce these goods itself, but imports them, the agreement makes it worse o¤.
Thus, we present a model that contains these four elements and microfounds our game. The model has two periods. In the …r s t period there are country-speci…c income shocks and consumers smooth consumption through international borrowing and lending. When a country borrows from abroad, it purchases more than it sells, and is in trade de…cit. Upon repayment of the debt it must generate a trade surplus. This is a standard approach to modelling imbalances (Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1996) ). Subsequently, in the second period, the trade negotiation game described in section 3 takes place.
B.1 Intertemporal preferences
As is common in the literature on trade imbalances, preferences over the intertemporal allocation of consumption expenditure and preferences over the intratemporal allocation of goods are separately de…ned (Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1996) ). Intertemporal utility in country i is given by U (C is country i's total consumption expenditure in period t. We do not need to specify a particular functional form. However, we assume that
< 0: intertemporal preferences are concave. This bring about the incentive to smooth consumption over time. Country i's representative consumer maximizes:
where is the discount rate. Income in the periods is given by
where Y is an exogenous income component and g C t i ; C t j is an income component that depends on consumption decisions in country i and abroad. It includes producer pro…ts and tari¤ revenues. Finally, t i is the country-speci…c income shock with t=1 i being independently and identically distributed across countries, while t=2 i = 0 for all countries. To smooth income shocks consumers are allowed to buy and sell an internationally traded bond, B, which pays interest rate r. Hence,
and
The bond is the only internationally traded asset. Financial market clearing requires that r adjusts so as to obtain
We can now rewrite the consumer's optimization problem to
where the outcome of trade negotiations in period 2 a¤ects g C t=2 i
; C t=2 j . In fact, we assume that governments play no role in the …r s t period, and that …r s t period tari¤s are exogenously given. Governments only play the negotiation game in period 2. By separating consumer and government decisions over the two periods, much complexity is avoided. In the second period governments take consumers'…rst period decision as given. And in the …r s t period consumers optimize taking into account the e¤ect that their borrowing and lending has on second period negotiations. The …r s t order condition to the consumer's problem yields:
where the e¤ect of the consumer's …r s t period decision on the outcome of the negotiation game in the second period is contained in
That is, country i experiences a negative income shock relative to other countries. Then, by
and, therefore, B i < 0 is optimal. Consumers in country i borrow in period 1 and repay in period 2. Notice that it is the relative size of shocks that determines borrowing and lending ( Therefore, borrowing in the …r s t period implies a weaker negotiation position in the second period (since country Z is the least favoured partner -see section 3). Likewise, …r s t period lending can bestow bene…ts beyond interest payment. This, of course, is factored into consumers'optimal borrowing and lending (through
) and hence into market clearing interest rates.
B.2 Intratemporal preferences
The intertemporal decision determines how much the domestic consumer spends on consumption each period. Intratemporal allocation within a given period faces the following budget constraint, therefore:
where c t ik is the consumption in country i of good k at time t, and p t ik is that good's price. Intratemporal utility over the consumption of the goods, u (c This will ensure that countries'relative market power over di¤erent product markets can be expressed in terms of di¤erences in consumption shares only.
B.3 Production
Producers in each country produce one good only, which is made nowhere else. Thus, each country exports one good and imports two, i.e., there is full specialization. We denote by c Production is subject to decreasing returns to scale and perfect competition. Denote by Q 
B.4 Tari ¤s
The di¤erence between the local price of an import good and the price in its country of origin, p 
C Derivation for application
To be able to derive a simple closed-form solution that can be used for application purposes, we simplify the general model in one important way. We assume that each country exports one unique good to each trade partner, and that only imported goods are consumed. The reason for this simpli…cation is that for any functional form, analytical derivations in the general model become virtually intractable. Given the general equilibrium nature of the setting and the fact that each country consumes each good, every price depends on every other of the nine prices in the world economy (one for each good in each country). Hence, each country's tari¤ setting a¤ects all prices and derivation of optimal tari¤s is extremely complex. The simpli…ed version, instead, remains remarkably tractable, as can be seen below. Of course, a setting that limits interactions between tari¤s and prices comes at the cost of reduced richness. Nonetheless, the basic trade-o¤ between market power and e¢ ciency gains from liberalization remains intact, as does its relationship to trade balances. And the obtained closed-form solutions allow for easy quanti…cation and applied analysis as done in section 5.
Note, however, that this simpli…cation only a¤ects the intratemporal aspects of the model. The intertemporal analysis remains as in equations (B.1) to (B.6). Intratemporal optimization then proceeds against given endowments, C i , as in equation (B.7). What remains to be determined, therefore, are the functional forms for intratemporal utility and the production function.
For intratemporal utility we choose the following functional form:
where c ij is the good consumed in country i and produced in country j, and m i is a money-metric utility term that includes tari¤ revenues, T R i , and producer surplus, P S i . Note that this money-metric term guarantees that budget constraints are exogenous within a given period, and intratemporal and intertemporal optimization are indeed unrelated. Standard demand derivation then yields
For production we use a linear function with zero intercept:
This satis…es the requirement of decreasing returns to scale (equation (B.10)), while the zero intercept serves to keep the number of exogenous parameters at a minimum. As will become apparent, this leads the model to an unambiguous quantitative prediction. Tari¤ revenues can now be written to whereas the value of its exports is
Hence, condition (C.9) has an intuitive interpretation: country X switches to regionalism when the value of its imports from country Z is more than twice the value of its exports to country Z. This is a very clear-cut prediction, which can be taken to the data, as done in section 5.
